The authors consider the interesting and important issue of Bayesian inference based on objective functions other than the likelihood. They focus on model selection in the low-dimensional setting using prequential local proper scoring rules.
General non-likelihood-based inference
There is a large and disparate literature on inference based on objective functions other than the likelihood. We will briefly mention some examples here, but we believe that a more thorough review and comparison would be a worthy endeavor.
Numerous objective functions have been proposed to replace the (log-)likelihood in pursuit of various inference goals. Proper scoring rules are a natural choice for serving as such objective functions, due to their property of being minimized (in expectation) under the true model. Depending on the goal of the analysis, certain well-known proper scoring rules can achieve robustness (e.g., continuous ranked probability score, or CRPS), have simple closed-form expressions (e.g., Dawid-Sebastiani score), or do not require densities (e.g., CRPS) or normalizing constants (e.g., Hyvärinen score, as in the present paper). See Gneiting and Katzfuss (2014) for a recent review of these and other scoring rules.
In a frequentist context, examples of approaches falling into this category of scoringrule-based inference are minimum contrast estimation (e.g., Pfanzagl, 1969; Birgé and Massart, 1993) , composite likelihood (e.g., Lindsay, 1988) , and M-estimation (e.g., Huber and Ronchetti, 2009) . Some further review is given in Dawid et al. (2014) .
There have also been related approaches in the Bayesian framework. Shaby (2014) provides a nice review of Bayesian inference using general objective functions and, based on results of Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) , he proposes an "open-faced sandwich adjustment" to obtain pseudo-posteriors with properly calibrated frequentist properties. Further, the "Gibbs posterior" (Jiang and Tanner, 2008; Li et al., 2013) has received considerable interest, where the negative log-likelihood is replaced by some "empirical risk" R n (usually targeting the specific parameter to be estimated) to construct a pseudo-posterior of the form
where λ is a positive scaling constant (often called "temperature"). Sampling from the pseudo-posterior Q can be performed via standard MCMC algorithms.
Objective Bayesian model selection
In objective Bayesian model selection, a discrete prior is assumed on a (finite) class of models, and given a particular model, objective improper priors are placed on the model parameters. While improper priors are commonly used for analysis of a single model, one faces difficulties in comparing models via Bayes factors, since the marginal likelihoods of the competing models are only specified up to arbitrary constants. A number of remedies have been proposed in the literature to deal with this issue, such as fractional Bayes factors (O'Hagan, 1995) and intrinsic Bayes factors (Berger and Pericchi, 1996) .
In the present paper, the authors take a different approach, which relies on replacing the (log-)marginal likelihood by a local proper scoring rule. The Hyvärinen score is recommended as a default. From the expression of the Hyvärinen score in the authors' equation (16), it can be seen that the arbitrary constant disappears. The authors look at examples where the Hyvärinen scores are analytically tractable and provide asymptotic orders for the difference in Hyvärinen scores assuming the respective models to be true.
Some clarification regarding practical implementation of the model selection procedure presented here would be helpful. When can we be sure that one model is truly better than another -or in other words, can anything be said about posterior model probabilities (also see Section 3 below)? Can the the necessary quantities be computed for models beyond the simple Gaussian examples considered in the paper?
Scaling issues
As indicated in (1) above, the literature on Gibbs posteriors typically includes a multiplicative scaling constant λ on the objective function. The choice of λ is considered a critical issue, as it has a direct effect on the (pseudo-)posterior uncertainty. Shaby (2014) does not consider a multiplicative scaling of the objective function, but his openface-sandwich correction automatically adjusts for such scaling, and his approach is thus invariant to scaling. Without such a correction, the scaling issue also arises when the objective function is specified to be a proper scoring rule, including the Hyvärinen score. As implicitly acknowledged by the authors in their Footnote 2, the scaling of a proper scoring rule is arbitrary, in that any proper scoring rule is still proper when multiplied by a constant.
In the context of model selection between models M 1 and M 2 with scores S M1 and S M2 , respectively, the scaling constant can arbitrarily inflate or deflate the pseudo Bayes factor,
and thus the amount of evidence in favor of M 1 over M 2 (cf. Kass and Raftery, 1995) . This also makes it challenging to compute pseudo posterior model probabilities, such as
If S M1 is larger than S M2 , (2) can be arbitrarily close to 0.5 or 1 by choosing λ to be very small or very large, respectively.
In light of these scaling issues, how should model selection be calibrated and interpreted? Moreover, is it possible to handle more than two competing models or even high-dimensional settings, where the number of competing models may grow exponentially with the sample size? In the high-dimensional linear regression context, Johnson and Rossell (2012) showed that a number of commonly used procedures (including fractional and intrinsic Bayes factors) assign vanishingly small posterior probabilities to the true model with increasing sample size. The scaling issue may assume an even more important role in such cases.
